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Secularism or Democracy presents a densely documented and nu-
anced argument for the accommodation of religious diversity. The 
book has a distinct practical import: it offers compelling arguments 
for the allocation of public funds and political privileges to religious 
organisations and representatives at a time when state support for 
religion has been put under some pressure in several Western-
European polities. Theoretically, it adds several innovative and stimu-
lating contributions to recent debates on the relationship between 
religion and politics in political theory. Most importantly, in my view, 
are the proposals that political theory ought to relinquish secularist 
terminology in favour of a democratic turn, and the supplementation 
of normative analysis with a more empirically informed ‘governance’ 
approach. In what follows I concentrate on these two contributions 
and I round up with a few remarks on Bader’s approach to political 
theory.  
The increased attention  on religion in recent political and social the-
ory has been accompanied by several pertinent criticisms of secular-
ism: the attempt to separate religion and politics in order to ensure a 
peaceful and  stable co-existence of a plurality of beliefs and practices. 
A number of authors have rejected the dominant tendency to analyse 
secularism in terms of a few abstract principles (freedom of con-
science, equal treatment) and have raised the question of what secu-
larism does. How is secularism embedded or constituted in national 
traditions? How have cultural assumptions regarding the place of 
religion in society influenced institutional arrangements concerning 
the separation of church and state? These questions have led to sev-
eral studies that highlight the differences between French, American 
and Dutch ways to separate church and state and have contributed to 
a pluralization of the concept of secularism. Poststructuralist authors 
have pursued the criticism of secularism in a somewhat different vein 
and have asked how secularism functions as a disciplinary project, 
how it excludes some ways of life, habits and sensibilities while natu-
ralizing others. This line of approach has also brought into view how 
secularist states have been involved and continue to participate in the 
construction of religious knowledge, beliefs and practices – or, what 
we might call, the partnership between the state and the production 
of religious truth. In political theory, the reconceptualization of secu-
larism in terms of a plurality of ethico-political and - in some circles 
more explicit then in others - power-laden projects, has problema-
tized the impartial pretensions of secular principles or procedures. 
Political theorists are now increasingly trying to develop more modest 
varieties of secularism,  looking for standards that do not collapse into 
overly rationalist or scientific worldviews.  
Bader adds a new and radical proposal to the politicization of secular 
enactments. Political theory should not only pluralize, contextualize 
and historicize secularism and modify its normative ambitions, but it 
is better off ‘dropping’ secularist vocabularies altogether. Secularist 
terminology has – especially in the Western European context - be-
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come too compromised and overburdened by cultural assimilation, 
totalitarianism and scientism. Since these threats to liberal democracy 
are deeply entangled with political ambitions to separate religion from 
politics, it is difficult to invoke secularist meta-narratives – including 
more moderate versions - to criticize them. Clearly, Bader’s criticisms 
of secularism should not be taken as a complete rejection of secular-
ism: a differentiation between state power and spiritual or religious 
authority remains a core feature of his conception of liberal-
democracy.1 Moreover, a central concern in this book is the attempt 
to carve out and protect a domain of religious freedom or action vis-à-
vis political projects that want to intervene in core issues of faith. This 
might be a reversal of strong secularist projects that expand political 
authority at the cost of religious autonomy but it is obviously not a 
complete escape from the difficult and value-laden task of having to 
demarcate and separate distinct religious and political domains. So, 
then, precisely what is at stake in the attempt to decentre secularism 
in political thought? The central thrust of Bader’s proposal seems to 
be to discourage a narrow-minded focus on religion. Framing political 
dilemmas in explicit secularist terms blinds us to secular fanaticisms – 
such as the aforementioned cultural assimilation and scientism - and 
makes religious fundamentalism appear as the only or primary dan-
ger to democratic life. Furthermore, it leads to an unproductive line 
of questioning and criticism: rather then asking whether institutions, 
practices, arguments and citizens have completely liberated them-
selves from religious belief and practices, political theory ought to 
stimulate a discussion on ‘the respective substantive content of op-
tions’ at issue and assess to what extent they are in line with liberal-
democratic norms. 
Although Bader somewhat exaggerates his radical departure from 
secularism, I think that his attempt to insert issues concerning relig-
ion and politics back into a wider democratic framework is a timely 
and much needed intervention. Secular-religious dichotomies indeed 
often enough have the unintended effect  of ‘exoticizing’ religion, be 
it as an intrinsic evil or good, and they have not been very helpful in 
stimulating a debate about the varieties of religious practices and be-
liefs and their relationships to democratic practices.  However, I have 
some doubts whether secularist terminologies primarily produce a 
mobilization against religion. Religious conservatives who represent 
religion as the primary carrier of moral virtues have likely benefited 
from distinctions that attribute religion with an exceptional status. 
Moreover, criticisms of secularism are not only a perilous undertak-
ing in countries with a strong conservative religious majority such as 
the United States, as Bader suggests. Intellectuals who wish to restore, 
or perhaps maintain, Christianity as the flagship of Western-European 
polities as a counterweight to cultural decline are a forceful voice in 
the choir that blames secularism for the evils of modernity.2 The pre-
cariousness of criticizing secularism should not stop us from decen-
tring overly secularist terminologies. Yet it does place strong demands 
on the democratic framework that wants to stimulate a discussion on 
all the alternative ways to regulate and separate religion and politics. 
Bader offers important suggestions to improve some of the blind spots 
in Anglo-Saxon liberalism that have hampered well-informed discus-
sions on substantive options. Yet notwithstanding his criticism of 
secularist liberals who try to expel religious truth claims from political 
debate, his framework is still animated by the political-liberal injunc-
tion to take ‘the truths of religion off the political agenda.’ (Rawls, 
1993, 1996, p. 150).  
 
Rethinking secular liberal conceptions of the state 
Bader presents a powerful criticism of the principle of strict state neu-
trality that has been defended by Rawls, and strict secularist and liber-
tarian American political theorists.  
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First, Bader convincingly takes issue with the argument that a frame-
work of individual rights will suffice for the equal treatment of reli-
gious citizens. This classical liberal or libertarian argument does not 
take into account how the ‘free market of religious customs and doc-
trines’ has historically been hampered by the structural legal, admin-
istrative and cultural advantages of majority religions. Second, Bader 
points out how   avoiding differences and neglecting the effects of 
state action blinds us to existing power relations, tends to reproduce 
‘mythical histories’ and leads to ‘deceiving actual descriptions.’ Instead 
of strict neutrality Bader proposes a more embedded notion of neu-
trality, or what has become known as ‘justice as even-handedness’. 
Essentially, this concept departs from a positive conception of reli-
gious freedom that, for instance, legitimates state support for religious 
organisations, and  opens up a space for the state to compensate ine-
qualities on the religious supermarket (such as affirmative action on 
behalf of religious minorities). It also foregrounds Bader’s own model 
of associative democracy: a type of governance that allows a wide-
spread allocation of public funds to faith-based organisations (FBO’s) 
that want to provide education and healthcare.  
FBO’s are not only eligible for public support but are also granted 
important exemptions on non-discrimination laws. When equal 
treatment of, say, gays or women, conflicts with core issues of faith, 
the balance is struck in favour of religious freedom. Bader gives an 
important argument for this right to ‘non-infringement.’ State inter-
ference in core issues of faith - theological disputes or issues concern-
ing ‘definition-making and decision-making in matters of belief’ - 
violates the need for intimacy: the possibility to experience and prac-
tice religious faith with likeminded believers while keeping pressures 
of the outside world at bay. I share Bader’s intuition that religious 
practices need some protection against overly ambitious states and his 
arguments for a more embedded notion of state neutrality are quite 
convincing. Yet, of course, the question arises: intimacy for whom? 
How does associative democracy distribute religious intimacy? Which 
believers can enjoy the benefits of non-infringement or this way of 
constructing the religious domain?  
Bader admits that the project of associative democracy contains a bias 
against new or smaller religious groups. Relatively well-established 
religious groups and organisations have structural advantages in the 
competition for public funds, and thanks to the financial and political 
privileges they obtain they can further consolidate their  position of 
power. Bader’s discussion of the exclusionary tendencies of associative 
democracy puts a lot of weight on institutional remedies to counter 
such biases, for example, shorter waiting periods for new groups that 
want to establish FBO’s and stakeholder meetings where ‘minorities in 
minorities’ can ventilate their concerns. I wonder however whether 
his analytical framework is rich enough to render these exclusions up 
for debate and contestation – even though he explicitly distances 
himself from the ‘blinding’ libertarian-legalistic and ideal-theoretical 
biases in Anglo-Saxon liberalism. According to Bader, normative 
judgments regarding issues of religion and politics, such as the desir-
ability or the type of state support for religion, cannot limit them-
selves to the analysis of constitutional principles but must also take 
into account all sorts of cultural, historical and informal power rela-
tionships such as assimilative pressures of nationally dominant relig-
ions vis-à-vis minorities. He therefore introduces the notion of ‘reli-
gious governance’: an analytical instrument that brings into view 
legal, cultural and informal strategies of regulations between (semi-) 
public actors (the state, European law, religious councils) and a vari-
ety of religious actors such as churches, congregations and informal 
religious networks. Given its focus on a wide variety of power rela-
tionships, governance could indeed be a promising counter-weight to 
overly legalistic or libertarian framings of the relationship between 
state and religion. In addition, relocating the state in a network of 
public and private interactions may also serve to problematize the 
classical opposition between state and civil society, a dualism that is, in 
different ways, still prevalent among many republican and liberal 
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political theorists. However, although Bader criticizes libertarians for 
their faith in unfettered self-organisation in ‘the religious supermar-
ket’, he sometimes invokes these libertarian tropes himself. Take for 
example his criticism of recent French policies that intended to create 
a privatised, Republican Islam. ‘The second main aim of the French 
administration has explicitly and consistently been to control and 
domesticate Islam, to assimilate Islam into the republic, to create a 
moderate, liberal and privatised ‘French’ Islam and to fight the idea of 
a ‘community’ that runs counter to French Republican principles … 
instead of allowing the free association and organisation of the differ-
ent ‘Islam(s) in France’ on their own terms’ (Bader, 2007, p. 234).3 
Even though Bader offers compelling arguments against French secu-
larism (laïcité), juxtapositions such as these too easily identify power 
with state action and fail to bring into view power relationships that 
structure the ‘free association’ in the religious supermarket. Further-
more, I don’t think this dualism is only a rhetorical attempt to mobi-
lize us against French laïcité but also that it points to a more struc-
tural problem in Bader’s analytics of governance itself, namely, the 
fact that it does not conceptualize the relationship between the state 
and the production of religious truth.  
 
The alliances between the state and religious truth 
Bader distinguishes governance from the production of, and struggle 
between, religious knowledge, interpretations and practices, or what 
is, perhaps ironically, qualified as ‘God’s Biggest Supermarket’. 
Whereas governance concerns intentional strategies of regulation, 
religious competition amounts to ‘an invisible-hand mechanism of 
customs, laws, self-regulation within and among competing religious, 
and of public(,) bodies’ (Bader, 2007, p. 50). The relationship between 
governance and this ‘invisible-hand’ mechanism is not always clear. 
Sometimes Bader suggests that the state (engaged in a network of 
governance) can limit itself to the establishment of preconditions for 
the religious supermarket, facilitating a healthy competition between 
religious truth rather then actively taking part in this struggle itself: a 
claim which fits nicely with the normative injunction that the state 
ought not to infringe upon core issues of faith. At other points it is 
acknowledged that the state cannot avoid infringing upon core issues 
of faith and thus takes part in these struggles (Bader, 2007, 135). (For, a 
state that wants to accommodate religion has to legally define relig-
ion, determine which religions will be recognized and, apart from 
legal practice, inspection, and negotiations, have some effects on the 
shaping of religious practice and doctrine within FBO’s.) Nonetheless, 
there is little attention, let alone a vocabulary, that highlights how 
the state is involved or could become a partner in the production of 
religious truth; the problem is recognized and classified as a ‘danger’ 
but it does not seem to merit further reflection.  
This omission is surprising. After all, state interventions in the reli-
gious supermarket are not only pursued in strong secularist projects 
such as French laicism or by states with an overt theological-
imperialist agenda such as the United States.4 States will also partici-
pate in the production of religious truth when they take to heart 
Bader’s own principle of state neutrality in terms of even-handedness. 
This guiding line calls upon state officials to take into account ‘all the 
particularities in the context at issue.’ Such a contextualized reason-
ing in religious matters will most likely have to draw upon theological 
expertise or scientific authorities that render an account of the basic 
tenets and interpretations of core issues of faith. In fact, the alliance 
between an even-handed state and expertise has become quite clear in 
recent discussions of the so-called Refah-case: a decision of the Euro-
pean Court on Human Rights in which the Court argued that the 
Turkish state did not violate international juridical norms when it 
dissolved the Islamic Refah party. Critics of this court decision rightly 
criticised the Court for its static and essentialized conception of Islam 
and suggested that expert witnesses need to be brought into the 
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courtroom to arrive at more nuanced and contextual judgments.5 
Such a practice could indeed be an important counterweight to Ori-
entalist prejudices in the judiciary. However, it does immerse the state 
in the political contest between competing ‘Islams’, or different ways 
of studying, interpreting and experiencing Islam. It also suggests that 
the political questions of today are perhaps not whether the state 
‘should or should not’ intervene in core issues of faith - the way Bader 
tends to frame our choices - but rather which kinds of discourses the 
state - directly and indirectly - helps to produce and which ones it 
discourages.  
Analyzing the alliance between the state and religious expertise is not 
only crucial to diagnose the functioning of the principle of embedded 
neutrality; I think it is also pertinent to a discussion and a defence of 
associative democracy. Let us presume that associative democracy 
indeed succeeds in funding a plurality of FBO’s, ‘as many as citizens 
wanted to organise, catering to the various lifestyles of individuals and 
groups’ (Bader, 2007, p. 189). Should we then not also expect a prolif-
eration of conflicts between citizens and FBO’s, such as disagreements 
with regard to how associations apply and implement religious norms 
and standards? And is it not likely that some of these citizens will end 
up in courtrooms where judges and experts have to decide whether 
religious norms have indeed been implemented in a consistent man-
ner? Put otherwise, associative democracy may ‘thin’ out the state in 
terms of providing services but it could become a lot ‘thicker’ in terms 
of religious knowledge production. 
Theoretically, our analysis and judgment of associative democracy 
could benefit from conceptualizations undertaken in ‘governmental-
ity studies.’ This Foucaultian-inflected paradigm shares the presump-
tion of governance that political analysis needs to think ‘beyond but 
not without’ the state but it has also pointed out some of the short-
comings in the analytics of governance. For example, governmental-
ity theorists have argued that the tendency to naturalize the object of 
government in terms of free association and self-organisation in gov-
ernance studies remains too much indebted to classical-liberal dual-
isms and depoliticizing techniques. Bader’s assumption that associa-
tive democracy provides the preconditions of religious self-
organisation or competition is vulnerable to this charge: it fails to 
bring  to account how partnerships between the state and religious 
authorities are actively involved in the construction of religious sub-
jectivity. From the perspective of governmentality associative democ-
racy is a project through which the state ‘acts on[at?] distance’: a type 
of government that, first, constructs an autonomous domain outside 
of politics, such as ‘the religious supermarket’, and, secondly, man-
ages this domain through coalitions between the state and truth prac-
tices of spiritual authorities and scientific expertise (Rose, Miller, 1992, 
p. 180). If one starts from the assumption that the state is always, in 
different ways, implicated in a network of producing religious truths, 
the relevant political questions to ask would shift somewhat: before 
asking the prescriptive question ‘should the state ‘interfere’ or ‘stay 
out’ of core issues of faith’, we would be interested in finding out 
which networks of truths the state explicitly or implicitly partners  
with. Such an analysis has a obvious democratic import: if associative 
democracy will grant some religious citizens a ‘fairly thick shield of 
intimacy’, this seems all the more a pressing reason to bring the ex-
plicit and unintentional partnerships between the state and the pro-
duction of religious truth into view. 
Bader has not been very praiseful of the merits of poststructuralist 
interventions in the debate on religion and politics. It has to be admit-
ted that this paradigm has not put a lot of weight on developing con-
crete institutional alternatives – a practice which is indeed one way of 
doing democratic theory. However, analysing ruling assumptions and 
certain techniques within institutional proposals, such as political-
liberal strategies that render the production of truth in democratic 
life from sight, is at least as urgent. In my view Bader may rely too 
much on a strategy that the theorist Rancière termed as ‘parapolitics’: 
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the attempt to solve exclusions that arise as a result of institutional 
government through institutional remedies (such as stakeholders 
meetings etc.).  
Bader rejects recent tendencies in political theory to develop meta-
physical or ontological meta-narratives that might offer alternatives 
to predominant theistic, classical-liberal or libertarian ontologies.6 
Foucaultians or Deleuzian-inspired conceptions of democracy are 
accused of being overly perfectionist and sometimes even represented 
as contradictory to the ambition to keep the centre of democracy 
‘empty’ (Bader, 2007, p. 48)7 As a democratic political liberal Bader 
prefers a strategy of avoidance with regard to contentious issues and 
rather shifts the debates on ontological and epistemological issues to 
stakeholder meetings. Democratic theory should take the ‘actual 
definitions and voices [that arise in actual democratic dialogue, IR] as 
an inevitable threshold for non-paternalistic forms of democracy’ 
(Bader, 2007, p. 308). This appeal to non-paternalist theorizing seems 
belied by Bader’s own plea to displace secularism as a meta-narrative 
of democratic politics. Whatever you make of it, the attempt to de-
centre secularist parameters is a political intervention on behalf of the 
theorist to alter dominant and ‘actual’ self-understandings and voices 
that set the stage for current discussions today. Moreover, I wonder 
whether an appeal to anti-paternalist theorizing is indeed as democ-
ratic as Bader suggests; it might also consolidate the theorist as a spec-
tator of politics while doing little to bring into view how democratic 
thinkers, through their conceptual interventions, actively participate 
in the construction of democratic life. Bader has convincingly shown 
us some of the hazards of secularist political theory. But his discussion 
also raises the question whether it is perhaps not so much secularism 
tout court but rather secularism’s alliance with political liberalism 
that hampers a democratic engagement with religion. 
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1 An example: religious representatives may obtain seats in ethical committees but 
do not have a priori rights to mandate or control state policies and laws or the 
outcome of democratic deliberation. 
2 In his genealogy of secularism in nineteenth and twentieth century German 
thought, Hermann Lübbe argues that the secularisation-thesis gave support to 
positivist cultural political projects but was also central to several theological 
criticisms of civilizational decline in modernity (Lübbe, 1965, 2003: 87). For a 
recent criticism of secularism and the attempt to revive Christianity as the essence 
of Dutch communal life, see the Dutch bestseller ‘Time of discontent’ (‘Tijd van 
Onbehagen’) by philosopher Ad Verbrugge, Tijd van Onbehagen: Filosofische 
essays over een cultuur op drift (Amsterdam: Sun 2004). 
3 My emphasis. 
4 For a critical analysis of the progam to reform Islam in the Muslim World by the 
US State Department, see Mahmood, 2006.  
7 Bader’s allusion to Lefort is surprising. Lefort’s understanding of power in terms 
of an ‘empty space’ refers to the acknowledgement and institutionalization of 
conflict in democratic regimes. Even though democratic regimes are committed to 
a continuous problematization of the relationship between truth and politics, he 
does not suggest that political philosophers must try to avoid metaphysical or 
ontological questions. On the contrary: one of the distinct tasks that Lefort identi-
fies as political philosophical – and that has to be defended against attempts to turn 
political philosophy into political science - consists in a reflection on the ontologi-
cal conditions of possibility for democratic theory and practice. (‘The elaboration 
attested to by any political society [...] involves an investigation into the world, 
into Being as such.’ Lefort 1988: 219). 
6 For an account of the re-emergence of ontology in recent Anglo-American politi-
cal theory, see White, 2000. Oliver Marchart traces such developments in French 
post-War political theory, Marchart, 2007.  
5 See Moe, 2005. 
